Group communications on wireless networks are vulnerable to illegal ire, such as packet sniffing. If a group manages confidential information, secure group communication must be achieved by communing a common secret key – group key for the confidentiality of group messages with data encryption. In other words, it is important to decide on the distribution of a key among group members and the update of the group key for changing group membership [1-3]. A typical approach is based on centralized key distribution with a trusted third party (TTP) [4-8]. It offers scalable group key management for large groups with symmetric encryption such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and a hierarchical logical key structure. However, it depends enough on a permanently accessible TTP. This requirement is not suitable for mobile networks with peer-to-peer communication. To apply a symmetric key approach without TTP, a node must establish a secure connection to share a key in pairs with all other mobile nodes in the same group. It requires a lot of communication and depends on a different key sharing scheme.[9] Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange [10] is a protocol for creating a common key based on asymmetric keys without TTP. It allows two parties to share a key with their secrets on an uncertain channel. In order to extend the DH to the group parameter, Group Key Agreement Protocols (GKAs) were developed [11-16].

In protocols, also known as contributory key agreements, all members of the group contribute to the creation of a common key. While they provide dynamic management of group keys, they require important messages or operations to configure and update group keys. An approach to reduce computational costs provides an arboreal structure for key management. Tree-based group key protocols [15-18] must support the management of the tree structure and require orderly communication for the calculation of leaves to the root of the tree. The proof. A locker that the master receives from group members is what a group member signs with their public key certified by a certification body. Concretely, a locker is shredded by a disposable function like SHA-2, and Hash () is signed with the private key of the private key of, using a digital signature algorithm such as RSA, DSA and ECDSA. The locker is then checked with the public key, which is linked to and certified by the certification body.

If there is a non-member`s locker in a group`s locker list, they must have a forged signature. This means that the problem occurs during a hash collision or Rogue CA certificate [23]. . . .